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Since the dawn of the nuclear age small groups of activists have
consistently protested both the content of United States national security
policy, and the process by which it is made. Only occasionally, however,
has concern about nuclear weapons spread beyond these relatively
marginal groups, generated substantial public support, and reached
mainstream political institutions. In this paper, I use histories of peace
protest and analyses of the inside of these social movements and
theoretical work on protest cycles to explain cycles of movement
engagement and quiescence in terms of their relation to external political
context, or the "structure of political opportunity." I begin with a brief
review of the relevant literature on the origins of movements, noting
parallels in the study of interest groups. Building on recent literature on
political opportunity structure, I suggest a theoretical framework for
understanding the lifecycle of a social movement that emphasizes the
interaction between activist choices and political context, proposing a
six-stage process through which challenging movements develop. Using
this theoretical framework I examine the four cases of relatively broad
antinuclear weapons mobilization in postwar America. I conclude with a
discussion of movement cycles and their relation to political alignment,
public policy, and institutional politics.
Helen Caldicott (1984: 13) reports that reading Nevil Shute’s post-holocaust
novel, On the &ach, awakened in her a concern about nuclear weapons and a
passion for political action that animated her personal and political activity
for the following decades. While Dr. Caldicott’s efforts to press for nuclear
NOTE: I presented an earlier version of this paper at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, August 31, 1991, Washington, DC. For helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts, I want to thank Jim Ennis, John Garofano, Doug Imig, Paul
Joseph, Richard Kendrick, Richard Lachmann, Laura Reed, Tom Rochon, Mary
Ann Steger, the members of the Boston College Media Research Action Project, and
three anonymous reviewers.
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disarmament and arms control have been tireless, her audiences have been
much less so. Activists throughout much of the world shared Caldicott’s con-
cerns about the dangers of nuclear war in the early 1960s. Just a few years
later, however, media attention shifted to other issues, antinuclear organiza-
tions turned their efforts elsewhere, and nuclear war was a low priority on
most activist agendas. Mass concern returned in the early 1980s when Caldicott
was among the most visible leaders in the nuclear freeze campaign, speaking
to large audiences in a wide variety of venues. Buoyed by the support of a
large popular movement, which included the President’s daughter, Caldicott
even won a private meeting with President Reagan in the Oval Officer Just a
few years later, however, Caldicott was dispirited at the movement’s apparent
demise; the organizations that had carried the movement were in financial
and/or organizational crises, or moving on to other issues. This despite the
fact that both superpowers still possessed some tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons - easily capable of destroying the world - and the problems of nuclear
proliferation had increased. This paper is concerned less with why Caldicott
and a number of other dedicated activists have been able to maintain their
commitments and activity, than with why the movements they participated
in have fluctuated so dramatically.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age small groups of activists have consis-
tently protested both the content of United States national security policy,
and the process by which it is made. Only occasionally, however, has con-
cern about nuclear weapons spread beyond these relatively marginal groups,
generated substantial public support, and reached mainstream political insti-
tutions. Historians and analysts of specific campaigns have been able to iden-
tify the proximate causes of the rise and decline of particular movements,
noting both the political context and activist decisions, but rarely do they
attempt to discern more general explanations for the phenomenon of social
movement cycles. More recently, a few analysts have recognized and com-
mented on the sporadic nature of peace movement engagement (Boyer 1985;
Kleidman 1993; Mushaben 1985; Wittner 1988), but they have been more
concerned with claiming cumulative successes or avoiding what they see as
recurrent activist mistakes than in explaining the causes of cyclicity. In this
paper, I build on the histories of peace protest and analyses of the inside of
these social movements and theoretical work on protest cycles to explain
cycles of movement engagement and quiescence in terms of their relation to
external political context.
1 Accounts of the meeting differ on details (Caldicott 1984: 26-32; Kelley 1991: 413-14;
Reagan 1990), but agree it disappointed everyone involved.
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I begin with a brief review of the relevant literature on the origins of
movements, noting parallels in the study of interest groups. Building on the
concept of political opportunity structure, I suggest a theoretical framework
for understanding movement cycles that emphasizes the interaction between
activist choices and political context. I propose a six-stage development pro-
cess for movements that recognizes the continuity between extra-institutional
protest and institutional politics. Using this framework I examine the four
cases of relatively broad antinuclear weapons mobilization in postwar Amer-
ica. I conclude with a discussion of movement cycles and their relation to
public policy and institutional politics.
ON POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS
The question of why movements emerge has rightly occupied much scholarly
attention in both political science and sociology. The first wave of &dquo;collective
behavior&dquo; analysis in sociology (Smelser 1963) viewed movements as a prod-
uct of societal dysfunction, specifically the incapacity of society to integrate
its citizenry (e.g., Komhauser 1959). Movements represented a failure of
social or political institutions. The basic tenets of collective behavior approaches
did not stand up to empirical verification; they were also subject to political
challenge as they effectively &dquo;explained away&dquo; the real political grievances
challenging movements expressed. Scholars studying the social movements of
the 1960s developed a &dquo;resource mobilization&dquo; perspective (Lipsky 1970;
McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973) that emphasized not social fail-
ure but activist success. In this paradigm movements represent the purposive
application of resources to a social problem; essentially, protest as politics by
other means. Initially resource mobilization analysts were less concerned with
the political environment in which movements operated than in the tactics
and strategies organizers devised to overcome the &dquo;free rider&dquo; problem, that is
the &dquo;rational&dquo; tendency of citizens not to pursue collective goods through
political action (Olson 1965).
In political science, analysis of interest group origins developed in a sim-
ilar manner, albeit with important normative differences. Truman (1951)
argued that interest groups reflected and arose from &dquo;disturbances&dquo; produced
by new constituencies or problems. In contrast to the collective behavior
school, however, Truman and other pluralist analysts (e.g., Dahl 1963) viewed
the development of groups as a social good, reflecting a healthy democratic
polity. Critics quickly noted, however, that all disturbances were not equally
likely to create interest groups, that the political system advantaged certain
constituencies and problems (Bacharach and Baratz 1970; Schattschneider
1960), and that elite support was critical to a group’s emergence (Walker
1983, 1991), especially for groups that pursued various visions of the public
454
interest (Berry 1977; McFarland 1984). Analysts focused on the &dquo;issue
entrepreneur&dquo; who, by developing &dquo;exchange relationships&dquo; with constituents,
mobilized support and sustained a group (Salisbury 1969).
In both disciplines, students of interest groups and social movements
looked first at the larger society to explain and understand disruptive politics,
then shifted their analyses to micromobilization problems. Clearly, we need
to look at both activist efforts and political context to explain protest chal-
lenges. A &dquo;free rider&dquo; is likely to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of partici-
pation as political circumstances change (Meyer and Imig 1993). Thus activ-
ists against nuclear power drew larger crowds at demonstrations shortly after
the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, environmentalists found it easier to
raise money when the Secretary of Interior advocated opening national parks
for development, and abortion rights activists found mass media more atten-
tive when the Supreme Court seemed less likely to protect these rights (Schloz-
man and Tierney 1986). Similarly, funders are more likely to turn to interest
groups or social movements when they believe other means of influence on
critical issues are foreclosed, and the clever issue entrepreneur is most likely
to succeed when the issues she addresses are those of broad public concern.
Most recently, students of both interest groups and social movements
have recognized the essentially political character of extra-institutional dis-
sent, and its relationship to institutional political activity. In a study of chal-
lenging groups in America before World War II, Gamson (1990) found that
the structure of United States political institutions advantaged certain constit-
uencies and strategies of influence. Jenkins and Perrow (1977) identified the
critical role elite supporters played in aiding and amplifying recurrent
farmworker campaigns. Freeman (1975) emphasized the important role that
public policy played in the tactics women’s rights activists chose; similarly
Hansen (1985) looked at the policy context to evaluate farmers’ success and
failure in mobilizing challenging movements. In his studies of the civil rights
movement, McAdam (1982) advanced a political process perspective on social
movements that integrated close analysis of activist choices with a larger view
of both public policy and the political system. The essential point underlying
all of this work, as McAdam emphasized, is that the opportunities for protest
vary between policy areas and over time, and that they are closely tied to
institutional politics.
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY: STRUCTURE AND SPACE
&dquo;Political opportunity structure&dquo; (POS) promises the most productive way to
integrate analytically the process of political action with the social context in
which it takes place. Primarily used as a theoretical tool in cross-sectional
comparisons of protest in cities (Eisinger 1973), states (Amenta and Zylan
455
1991), or nations (Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1978), POS refers to the institutional
and political factors that shape social movement options. To date, analysts
have described a broad range of aspects of political opportunity as structure.
Summarizing this work, Tarrow (1988: 430) identifies five interdependent
variables comprising POS: the degree of openness in a political system; the
stability of political alignments; the relationships between challengers, and
between challenging groups and supporters; the nature of elite cohesiveness
and tolerance to protest; and the patterns of intermediation between state and
society.
Building on Tarrow’s work, we can specify POS more clearly so that con-
cepts can be applied across time, different movements, and states. We can
begin by making a rough distinction between relatively stable aspects of
opportunity, particularly regarding political culture and institutional arrange-
ments, and more dynamic aspects of opportunity, which involve partisan
alignment and elite allegiance. Meyer (1990: 8) describes these more fluid
elements of opportunity as &dquo;political space,&dquo; or &dquo;the opportunities for legiti-
mate mobilization not monopolized by established linkage mechanisms.&dquo; Even
in the context of stable institutions, opportunities are influenced by changing
positions of elites, parties, and/or interest groups (Byme 1991), and also by
the changing boundaries of legitimacy in discourse (cf. Gamson 1988). The
fluid aspects of opportunity are critical in explaining social movement cycles;
political opportunity stuctures did not change appreciably in the past four
decades. The United States maintains generally the same electoral structure,
dominated by two parties, the same weak policy implementation structures,
and the same single-member district system of representation. Nonetheless,
the success and issues of challenging movements have changed dramati-
cally-as has the relative positioning of actors within the structure of political
opportunity.
Political space exists when there is a disjuncture between popular con-
cerns and public policy that established institutions, particularly parties or
interest groups, are not addressing. This disjuncture can be the result of
changes in opinion, policy, or political alignments. Political opportunity, of
course, is not synonymous with protest, nor does it cause protest. Rather,
changes in opportunity alter the prospects for activist challengers to reach a
broader audience and potentially influence policy. States and related social
and political institutions have a variety of possible responses to insurgent
movements, including ignoring them. When this is impossible, parties and
governments may seek to suppress movements, coopt their concerns and lan-
guage, and/or acquiesce to movement demands. Most significantly, estab-
lished institutions and actors reclaim their political hegemony, crowding insur-
gent movements out of the political space they once occupied. This is the
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basis for a cyclic pattern of social movement challenges, as concerns or con-
stituencies that may occasionally emerge in extra-institutional protest are
reintegrated with the polity and dissidents adopt less disruptive means of
political participation.
Recognition of cycles of movement challenges and quiescence is not new.
Oddly, however, theorists have tended to attribute variations in dissident
mobilization to essential constants: for example, the inevitability of disap-
pointment in human nature (Hirschman 1982), the intractability of social
problems (Downs 1972), or macrohistorical patterns in history (Schlesinger
1986). Tarrow (1989) offers a more promising approach, explaining protest
cycles by looking at varying political circumstances, or shifts in political
opportunity. As Klandermans (1991: 14) argues, &dquo;A cycle of protest is a fun-
damentally political process; political opportunities play a crucial role in the
development and decline of such cycles.&dquo;
Most theories of political opportunity are global in nature, emphasizing
opportunity writ large for all sorts of social movements (e.g., Brand 1990;
Goldstone 1980; Tarrow 1991), times when states are most receptive or vul-
nerable to insurgent challenges; they make few distinctions regarding the
causes or constituencies challengers embrace. Tarrow’s (1989) cycles of pro-
test are defined by a broad range of actors engaging in unconventional action
in pursuit of a wide range of goals. Clearly, however, under certain circum-
stances one set of issues will become more salient than another. The external
political environment also shapes decisions elite actors make about whether
to sponsor, tolerate, or repress protest activity (Walker 1991), and whether to
pursue their own goals through institutional or extra-institutional activity.
Individuals choose to exercise &dquo;voice&dquo; alone-by participating in conventional
politics, or in conjunction with institutional &dquo;exit&dquo; - by abandoning or sup-
plementing conventional political activity. As Hirschman (1970: 104-105)
explains, &dquo; ... the alternative is now not so much between voice and exit as
between voice from within and voice from without (after exit). The exit deci-
sion then hinges on a totally new question: At what point is one more effec-
tive ... fighting mistaken policies from without than continuing the attempt
to change policies from within?&dquo; People make this decision by evaluating the
relative prospects for influence each strategy promises at a given time.
Policy analysts, who look at specific issue areas and opportunities within
them, help us look at variations in opportunity. Kingdon (1984), examining
the ascendence of particular issues within government, terms the opportunity
for major policy innovation or reform an &dquo;open window.&dquo; Windows open, he
suggests, in response to three distinct streams, politics, policy, and problems.
When they do, &dquo;issue entrepreneurs&dquo; may win access to political decision-
makers and even influence within the arenas of power. Political organizers,
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sponsors, and occasional activists choose causes and conduct in response to
their judgment about how open various windows are. Public policy and polit-
ical alignment make certain issues most attractive or urgent to organizers and
more vulnerable to outside influence. It is not then surprising that Americans
concerned with peace and social justice might work for a nuclear test ban in
1963, civil rights in 1964, and to stop military escalation in Vietnam in 1965.
Government responses, such as negotiating a test ban treaty in 1963 and
passing a Civil Rights Act in 1964, make extra-institutional politics appear
less necessary, as institutional actors ostensibly pursued similar goals with
some success. As institutional actors claim some portion of activist goals and
rhetoric, challengers must cope with less available political space. Cycles of
protest, unlike waves or cyclic patterns in the physical sciences, are bounded
by the contingent nature of movement claims and state responses. As a result,
the concept is more useful in analyzing cyclic pattems in movement chal-
lenges than in predicting the emergence, development, or outcomes of chal-
lenging campaigns.
OPPORTUNITY AND THE EFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE
People naturally and rationally seek the most direct lines of influence they
believe possible (Downs 1957). One’s political choices are rightly affected by
one’s proximity to the locus of decision making, available political resources,
the magnitude of the changes sought, as well as the responsiveness of those
in power to both dissenters and their ideas. An elected official, for example,
has greater access to policymaking power than a voter. Proximity to power,
however, brings with it restrictions on both tactics and ideas. Comprehensive
reforms or criticisms rarely come from above; rather, those close to power
generally manage marginal increments of reform rather than wholesale changes,
and then usually in response to pressure for greater changes from below.
Political tactics also change in relation to an actor’s social and political loca-
tion. Neither Robert McNamara nor Richard Perle, for example, recent critics
of United States national security policy, is likely to lie across railroad tracks
or throw rocks to promote his policy preferences; their ideas may not be so
different from current policy that such conduct appears warranted; more sig-
nificantly, each man has more direct and potentially efficacious routes to
influence. Much further from the center of the policy process, poor people
dependent upon government support are unlikely to exercise influence except
by extreme political methods (Piven and Cloward 1979).
We can think about this principle of efficient choice as hierarchical. Every-
one might prefer to exercise influence by sneaking through a policy window
to a president’s office. If this option appears foreclosed, however, an &dquo;issue
entrepreneur&dquo; is likely to seek influence elsewhere, either in the bureaucracy,
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Congress, or in many policy arenas at lower levels of government; the judicial
system, the media, and the mass public generally provide less direct routes to
influence. People pick the route they believe most likely to be effective after
surveying their political resources and opportunities. Rarely does one protest
outside the White House when one believes that he can effect meaningful
influence within.2 Thus there is a process of seeking an open window at the
highest possible level. Lower levels of government and society are generally
permeable to citizen access, but they are also distant from policy influence.
(As a result, the incentive to participate at lowest levels also diminishes.)
Even though the decision about whether and how to participate is rational,
the information one considers in making it is socially constructed. The urgency
of an issue, the viability of various policy alternatives, the range of available
froms of collective action (Tilly 1978), and the likely efficacy of alternative
tactics are all subject to manipulation by government, activists, and other
interested parties (Edelman 1971; Gamson 1988; Ryan 1991).
The American polity was designed as a self-righting and stable system
that allows relatively easy access to a wide variety of groups and individuals,
but strictly limits the influence any group can have on policy. Historically,
successful challenging groups have emphasized entrance to and legitimation
within the political system, rather than either substantive or structural changes
(Gamson 1990). As a result, the process of social mobilization has cyclical
elements, as extra-institutional mobilization gives way to organization-building
and institutionalization. Established organizations routinize their behavior to
ensure organizational maintenance and stability (Walker 1991: 15), and become
a component of the political opportunity structure new challengers face. Meyer
and Imig (1993) offer a schematic view of the process:
1. Policy Problem: change in objective conditions, or perceptions of
conditions.
2. Elite schism: divisions among elites about definitions of problems and
potential solutions.
3. Media attention: recognizing problem, framing potential solutions, defin-
ing legitimate players.
4. Dissident Activism: projection of policy alternatives
5. Elite response: alliance building; redefinition of challenging claims.
6. Institutional Accommodation: management of problem; fragmentation of
dissident coalition.
2 Linus Pauling provides a notable exception to illustrate the general rule. In 1962, pro-
testing the United States’ decision to resume nuclear testing, Pauling picketed the White
House on April 28, then attended a dinner for Nobel laureates inside the next day
(Seaborg: 150-51).
459
This model locates the origin of challenging social movements in the pol-
icy process, assuming that protest expresses some kind of collective rational-
ity, and that what happens on the edge of political institutions is closely
related to what occurs within. Clearly all changes in policy or governmental
process do not lead to mass social protest; the extent of movement activism
depends upon the state’s political management of elite dissent, and the stra-
tegic and tactical choices dissidents make. At every stage of the sequence,
further development may be preempted by state action and/or activist choices.
Further, it is important to recognize that these processes are not completely
distinct and sequential; rather, there is an ongoing interactive process of def-
inition among all the players (Solop 1991). Nonetheless, the model provides a
framework for organizing analyses and comparing dissident social move-
ments over time.
CYCLES OF PEACE PROTEST IN AMERICA
Protest movements are comprised of diverse efforts, potentially including
institutional politics, extra-institutional protest, political violence, public edu-
cation programs, and cultural activities. There are very visible venues, such as
the floor of the House of Representatives or the Nevada atomic testing site,
and far less visible ones, including local governments and activist living
rooms. Nonetheless, scholars and activists share a broad consensus about the
peaks and troughs of mobilization against nuclear weapons (DeBenedetti
1980; Kleidman 1993; Wittner 1984, 1988). Activists staged two broad-
based mass movements against U.S. nuclear weapons policy, one running
from 1955 to 1963 (the test ban campaign), the next emerging in the early
1980s (the nuclear freeze movement). Two smaller challenges were comprised
of elite-based campaigns with less extensive mass support and political visi-
bility, one from 1945 to 1947, in response to the immediate shock of the
Hiroshima bomb, the other from 1968 to 1972, during the debate on antibal-
listic missile (ABM) deployment. The figures below provide a crude measure
of movement challenges using the New York Times’ monthly coverage of this
broad range of opposition to the U.S. government’s nuclear weapons policies.
Peace organizations survived throughout the postwar period, and before,
but their number, resources, and success in mobilizing mass attention and
mainstream support varied dramatically. It is, of course, possible that periods
of mass attention reflected that activists at those times were particularly
sophisticated or clever in crafting appeals and devising strategies. This is
doubtful; the diversity of challenging groups, and the continued presence of
many of the same leaders in both good times and bad, suggest that variations
in activist tactics cannot explain movement cycles well. Further, the peace
group sector as a whole has fluctuated in concert, with both radical and mod-
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erate groups flourishing and fading at roughly the same times (Wittner 1984).
Nor has mass public opinion on nuclear weapons changed dramatically. Most
Americans have historically been scared of both nuclear weapons and the
Soviet Union (e.g., Graham 1989; Yankelovich and Doble 1984). Politicians,
peace activists, and policymakers have played these fears off each other, and
one fear or another has dominated at times (Miller 1985), but clearly it is not
so much base mass opinion that changes, but rather the intensity of concern
and policy preferences, and the strategic political choices dissidents make.
Taken together, this is the mobilization context, or the political space avail-
able to movements. By looking at cyclic challenges in the four campaigns, we
can see the changing nature of political opportunity, that is, shifts in available
political space.
THE SCIENTISTS’ CAMPAIGN FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL3
The policy problem that spurred the first antinuclear movement was the intro-
duction of nuclear weapons into the calculus of United States foreign and
military policy, which virtually mandated a radical departure from previous
policies. Importantly, even before the war, and among those few people actu-
ally aware of the bomb’s existence, there was no consensus about either the
use of atomic weapons or their eventual role in foreign policy. An elite schism
thus preceded even public knowledge of the bomb and the attendant political
decisions it mandated. In 1944 Neils Bohr and a number of other scientists
asked U.S. leaders to share information about the development of nuclear
weapons with their allies in order to begin building a cooperative atomic
weapons control regime to commence after the war. American officials were
suspicious, dismissed the ideas, and placed Bohr under surveillance. Simi-
larly, early in 1945 the Franck report calling for a demonstration of the bomb
rather than its use against Japan was dismissed without much thought. The
end of the war allowed debates that had been kept within a small circle of
experts to reach the mass media and the general public, creating a policy
problem as the elite policy debate was no longer contained by wartime con-
sensus or political management.
Mass media attention to the devastating new weapon seen to have ended
the war was understandably overwhelming. The horrific destruction at
Hiroshima seemed to usher in an era of new possibility and urgency. Almost
immediately after the news became public, newspapers, magazines, and mov-
ies grappled with the bomb. Norman Cousins’ influential essay, &dquo;Modem Man
is Obsolete,&dquo; written just a week after the Nagasaki bomb, was in many ways
3 This section draws on Boyer 1985; Bundy 1988; DeBenedetti 1980; Josephson 1988;
McCrae and Markle 1989; Smith 1965; Wittner 1984.
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a characteristic response. The bomb raised existential questions, Cousins
wrote, &dquo;Is war in the nature of man?&dquo; For Cousins (1945: 8), nuclear weapons
represented a new problem for which there was only one solution: &dquo;In the
absence of world control as part of world government, it [the atomic bomb]
will create universal fear and suspicion.&dquo; Cousins, along with numerous other
writers, called for moral consideration and unspecified political action. Thus
while the media fed public curiosity in the bomb, it attached no clear solu-
tions to the problems it identified.
- Figure 1
NEW YORK TIMES COVERAGE OF OPPOSITION TO US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES,
BY MONTH, 1945-51 1
Atomic weapons came to the head of the agenda in both academia and
mass culture. Magazines and academic journals published special issues, aca-
demic and cultural organizations sponsored symposia, and politicians inside
and outside of government called for mass education on nuclear weapons.
Boyer (1985: 32) writes there were two essential components to the Ameri-
can response to atomic weapons: fear, and an &dquo;unfocused conviction that an
urgent and decisive response was essential,&dquo; although there was no clarity on
what this response might be. The most frequently articulated alternative pol-
icies were those Cousins proposed: international control of nuclear weapons,
and world government. Several local groups of scientists formed by the end of
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1945, all concerned with public education on nuclear weapons, most notably
through the new Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and supportive of intema-
tional control. Non-scientists-including future president Ronald Reagan (Cannon
1991: 62, 292)-joined the United World Federalists, also formed shortly
after the war, pressing for international cooperation. Importantly, none of
these groups provided blueprints for government policy or citizen action. As
a result, dissident action was confined to public discussions of generally vague
ideals, and not political activity of any kind.
Elite responses, inside and outside of government, continued the debate
begun before Hiroshima. Within government, Secretary of State Byrnes com-
missioned a high-profile commission to consider the new issues of the nuclear
age. The Acheson-Lilienthal &dquo;Report on International Control of Atomic Energy&dquo;
called for the United Nations to establish an international atomic control
regime. The administration divided on the issue, however, and President
Truman’s appointment of Bernard Baruch as special ambassador on interna-
tional atomic weapons control, by all accounts, doomed the plan to failure.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union in the UN stalled over Baruch’s insistence
on swift and sure punishment for treaty violations, a system that would effec-
tively nullify the Soviets’ UN veto. By early 1948 the UN proposal was dead,
and division within the administration prevented bilateral agreements with
the Soviet Union. Although nuclear issues were discussed in great detail in all
sorts of public venues, the focus was generally on existential shock rather
than political alternatives.
The heated policy debate never reached the general public. For most
people the war’s end meant demilitarization and remobilization of the Amer-
ican economy (Huntington 1961: 35). Domestic affairs dominated govern-
ment and public attention. Activist leaders demanded public attention and
action, but failed to provide attractive or even potentially efficacious strategies
for action. The most visible proposal for responding to the new nuclear threat
was an ill-defined plan for the international control of nuclear weapons,
sometimes expressed as a demand for world government. The Truman admin-
istration, Byrnes and Truman particularly, was skeptical of these plans, but it
ostensibly pursued them in the UN. The &dquo;Baruch plan&dquo; coopted or preempted
disarmament advocates. The Truman administration was able to manage the
debate essentially by accepting the general concerns and language of advo-
cates of international control, but attaching its own conditions. The government’s
institutional accomodation of partisans of restraint was to endorse the senti-
ment, but emphasize its impossibility. The administration, and indeed most
of the public and many peace activists, blamed the failure of international
control on Soviet intransigence. Truman responded to the growing threat he
saw by developing a strong and permanent national security establishment,
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operating both abroad and in the United States, and securing a network of
alliances to contain Soviet expansionism.
In response to developing Soviet policies-and the harsher and more crit-
ical domestic political environment- most activists perceived little alternative
but to support United States policies. The road to disarmament and interna-
tional cooperation led through the Soviet Union, a path foreclosed in foreign
policy by Soviet action, and domestically by a new obsession with internal
security. The administration worked to displace public fear of nuclear weap-
ons to a more immediate fear of the Soviet Union, and framed international
cooperation to include only Western allies. Media attention was massive, but
essentially undirected. Both governmental and non-governmental elites sub-
stituted unilateralism for internationalism. Cord Meyer, Jr., first head of the
World Federalists, and author of One World or None, joined the CIA to pursue
a new internationalist vision. Many supporters of intemational control also
supported the Korean war, imagining a new era of international cooperation
springing from the multilateral military effort. Fear of nuclear weapons was
outstripped by fear of the Soviet Union, and ameliorated with optimism about
the promise of atomic energy (Boyer 1985). Antinuclear activism disappeared
from the public debate as a new Cold War consensus emerged, a consensus
so broad that it was fairly easy to marginalize or repress those who might
question it. Mass concern never translated into political action. Absent sub-
stantial mass dissident action, the government could manage the conflicts
about nuclear weaponry on its own terms, institutionalizing dissent by coopt-
ing public concerns about common security in the service of unilateralism.
THE TEST BAN CAMPAIGN4
The test ban campaign resulted from a coincidence of a new provocation,
demonstrable evidence of the dangers of atmospheric testing, and enhanced
political opportunity. The end of the Korean War and the censure of Senator
Joseph McCarthy opened space for political debate inside and outside gov-
ernment. Lessened fear of repression allowed dissidents to question govern-
ment policy openly and to propose new alternatives. Concern about nuclear
weapons generally, and atomic testing specifically, animated three waves of
peace activism, punctuated by two presidential elections. Each wave of activ-
ism was greater than the one preceding, as the 1956 and 1960 elections failed
to resolve public fears of radioactive fallout quickly or easily. Public recogni-
tion of the dangers of testing created the relevant policy problem. The March
1954 BRAVO tests in the Bikini Islands catapulted nuclear weapons and the
4 This section draws on Bundy 1988; DeBenedetti 1980; Divine 1978; Katz 1986;
Kleidman 1993; Knopf 1991; Seaborg 1981; Wittner 1984; York 1987.
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~ Figure 2
NEW YORK TIMES COVERAGE OF OPPOSITION TO US NATIONAL SECURITY POLIQES,
BY MONTH, 1951-64
arms race to mass public attention. Radioactive fallout from one test covered
The Lucky Dragon, a Japanese tuna trawler, contaminating its crew and catch,
and drawing international attention to the hazards of atomic testing.
An elite schism was visible almost immediately, as international allies,
including Pope Pius XII, Jawaharal Nehru, the British Labour party, and the
Japanese Diet appealed to United States to stop testing and negotiate a test
ban. Media attention followed both reports on the testing and international
criticism, as doctors and scientists debated the dangers of radioactive fallout
in both specialized journals and mass market magazines. This spurred an
almost immediate wave of dissident activism directed toward the demands of
testing critics. International efforts were echoed and amplified at home; hun-
dreds of letters arrived daily at the White House supporting a test ban.
The Eisenhower administration was divided on test ban proposals, and
even on whether or not to release complete information on radioactive fallout
from the recent tests. This division, and the administration’s incapacity to
respond to public concern effectively, allowed others to define the problem
and possible solutions. Scientists were most notable in framing elite responses.
In February 1955, physicist Ralph Lapp published detailed information on
the BRAVO fallout in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, nearly a week before
the Atomic Energy Commission released its own report. Lapp’s ability to
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scoop the government helped undermine public confidence in the Eisenhower
administration. Shortly afterward, a group of international scientists issued
the &dquo;Einstein-Russell Manifesto,&dquo; calling for an end to both testing and the
arms race. Test ban proponents approached the issue with a variety of con-
cems, some seeking simply to stop radioactive fallout, others to slow the
technological arms race, while still others saw a test ban campaign as a way
to build a broad movement for nuclear disarmament. Public debates among
scientists and military experts raged about the necessity of continued testing,
the dangers of fallout, and the reliability of non-intrusive means to detect
testing.
The debates found a broad and interested audience. Public recognition of
the dangers of nuclear fallout provided an opening for peace activists to lodge
claims against the nuclear arms race and the United States’ role in it. Fear of
fallout, coupled with increased anxiety about US preparations for war with
the Soviet Union, especially a large domestic civil defense campaign, provided
a fertile base of support upon which activists could draw. The federal
government’s neglect of growing public concern opened political space for
dissent, space first claimed by pacifist activists. On June 15, 1955, when
New York City conducted its first annual air raid drill, several members of the
Catholic Workers refused to take cover in a shelter, sitting on park benches
and waving placards instead. Police arrested 29 people, and the trial judge set
bail at $1500, denouncing the protesters as &dquo;murderers&dquo; (Ellsberg 1983: 277-78).
Both the Republican administration and the Democratic opposition made
efforts at institutional accomodation. Public pressure led Eisenhower to appoint
Harold Stassen as a special adviser on disarmament. In 1956, as the Senate
held hearings on testing, activists urged Democratic presidential candidate
Adlai Stevenson to support a test ban. Against the advice of campaign staff,
Stevenson made the issue a central point in his campaign. Eisenhower, per-
sonally ambivalent about a test ban, refused to discuss it publicly, arguing
against politicizing national security matters. Shortly after winning reelection,
however, he instructed his staff to explore possibilities for negotiated limits
on testing more vigorously.
These efforts at accomodation failed visibly. Shortly after his appoint-
ment, Stassen announced that disarmament was impossible as a practical
matter. Stevenson’s defeat spurred further anti-testing activism, as it dashed
hopes that meaningful reform could be achieved through the electoral pro-
cess. Dissident activism reemerged in a wide variety of forms as test ban advo-
cates sought other routes for influence, as two broad wings of a movement
emerged. One called for international agreements coupled with unilateral
restraint, and pressed its claims through public education efforts. Its adher-
ents issued appeals, staged international conferences, including the first Pugwash
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meeting, organized rallies, and ran newspaper and television advertisements.
SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, founded in 1957, typified
this liberal internationalist approach. Concurrently, several groups drawing
from smaller left and pacifist bases of support launched a campaign of civil
disobedience and direct action aimed at raising the political costs of contin-
ued testing. Activists again disrupted civil defense exercises in New York
City, sitting on benches outside City Hall with signs such as &dquo;End War-the
only defense against Atomic Weapons.&dquo; Pacifist leader A. J. Muste organized a
series of trespass campaigns on the Nevada test site (Robinson 1986).
Muste also helped raise money for a more dramatic trespass effort, paci-
fist Albert Bigelow’s (1959) attempt to sail The Golden Rule into the Pacific
test site in 1958. Stalled by repeated arrests, Bigelow and his crew did not get
close to the test site, but inspired anthropologist Earle Reynolds in a similar
effort with his ship, the Phoenix. In the United States media attention to these
efforts was extensive, creating political space for a more moderate public edu-
cation campaign. Dramatic direct action efforts expanded the boundaries of
legitimate public discourse. Subsequently pacifist activists organized peace
walks, sit-in demonstrations, and other civil disobedience efforts. Activists
recognized the two wings of the movement working in concert would heighten
the visibility and effectiveness of both. Many of SANE’s founders simulta-
neously organized the Committee for Non-Violent Action to coordinate paci-
fist efforts.
As the movement grew, however, and particularly as it won attention
(and the promise of political response) from the media and elected officials, it
focused more narrowly on a test ban. By the middle of 1957, even Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles was open to negotiating a test ban, largely because
of what he described as the &dquo;propaganda drubbings&dquo; the United States was
taking on the issue (Seaborg 1981: 10). Eisenhower and Khrushev presided
over a testing moratorium from 1958-1960. The moratorium stalled dissent
of all kinds, as the administration had seemingly made effective progress in
resolving, or at least stilling, the policy problem of testing.
Activism would reemerge with the problem of nuclear testing. In the
1960 campaign both presidential candidates promised increased efforts to
secure an arms control agreement on testing. Formal negotiations stalled how-
ever, and Eisenhower emphatically advised incoming President Kennedy about
the need to resume testing. (This stands in contrast to his well-known fare-
well address warning of the dangers of the military-industrial complex.)
Increased testing on both sides early in Kennedy’s term spurred protest
efforts and activism. The Cuban missile crisis underscored the urgency of
managing the nuclear rivalry with the Soviet Union, and accentuated the
administration’s drive to establish an arms control regime. Kennedy used
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antinuclear activist Norman Cousins to open a back channel for negotiations
with Khrushchev, securing an agreement to ban atmospheric testing. The
government thus forged an effective alliance with elite leaders in the move-
ment. The eventual agreement stopped the present danger of atmospheric
testing; it also effectively ended the antinuclear movement.
&dquo;The limited test ban was more an environmental measure than arms
control,&dquo; said Spurgeon Keeny, who had served as a science adviser to Pres-
ident Kennedy. &dquo;It made the world safe for testing&dquo; (Herken 1987: 186).
Nonetheless, the more institutional wing of the peace movement, led by
SANE, actively lobbied the Senate to secure ratification, a ratification Presi-
dent Kennedy bought with a commitment to an accelerated underground
testing program. The end of superpower atmospheric testing and the estab-
lishment of an ongoing arms control process also restored a new elite con-
sensus, institutionalizing both arms control and a technological arms race. It
effectively protected US nuclear policies from strong domestic criticism. The
partial test ban, certainly much less than most activists called for, nonetheless
limited activists’ ability to press broader claims. Kennedy’s institutional
accomodation legitimated both control and modernization of nuclear weapons,
and effectively institutionalized partisans of both positions.
THE ABM DEBATE5
Antiballistic missile systems continue to pose a difficult challenge for US
policymakers, an unresolved policy generally managed successfully so that it
does not become a public policy problem. The notion of developing an imper-
meable shield to secure Americans against nuclear attack has obvious politi-
cal appeal. At the same time, the costs, technological limitations, and strategic
implications of deploying an anti-missile system are strong disincentives. For
years the United States had effectively avoided a decision by foregoing deploy-
ment of successive generations of ABMs while researching more capable
follow-on systems. The Soviet deployment of the Galosh ABM system outside
Moscow in 1966 provoked a policy debate within the Johnson administra-
tion, increasing the urgency of an ABM decision. This forced decision win-
dow, amid a pre-existing elite schism, created both political and policy prob-
lems. Some civilian strategists, acknowledging the high cost and dubious
military value of an ABM, urged Johnson to deploy a system anyway, empha-
sizing its symbolic importance. For Secretary of Defense McNamara, the deci-
sion not to deploy was easy on tecnical grounds, but difficult politically.
Although he rejected development of a &dquo;heavy&dquo; system to defend against
5 This section draws from Bundy 1988; Herken 1987; Katz 1986; McNamara 1968;
Primack and von Hippel 1974; York 1987.
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Soviet missiles, he proposed instead a &dquo;light&dquo; system, ostensibly to guard
against China and other small nuclear forces (see McNamara 1968).
The Secretary’s half-answer, clearly devised more as a political than a
strategic move, satisfied no one. ABM supporters charged the Johnson admin-
istration with leaving America undefended. Scientific opponents of the ABM
also addressed the issue aggressively and publicized their differences with
the administration through articles in scientific journals and testimony before
Congress. Media attention, albeit more modest than the test ban campaign
enjoyed, followed the elite debate. ABM opponents also pressed peace activ-
ists to address the issue. Early in 1968, David Inglis, then senior physicist at
Argonne National Laboratories, urged SANE to oppose the ABM (Katz 1986:
129). Unable to achieve their goals through conventional politics, institutionally-
oriented scientists turned to mass politics, trying to spur dissident activism in
service of policy goals they had already defined.
Upon his election, President Nixon proposed accelerated ABM develop-
ment to defend both US weapons and major metropolitan areas, essentially
ignoring ABM opponents. This engendered a wave of activism among both
atomic scientists who doubted the wisdom and feasibility of such systems,
and local residents who opposed deployment of nuclear weapons near their
homes. Activists sponsored teach-ins and rallies in cities where ABMs were
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to be deployed, including Chicago, Seattle, and Boston. This alliance, between
elite opposition and mass action, created a strong political force. Coordinated
by groups like the new Union of Concern Scientists, formed to organize sci-
entific opposition to the war in Vietnam, ABM opponents testified before
Congress, giving cover to congressional opponents, and conducted public
education campaigns to buttress opposition at the grassroots. In August 1969,
the Senate was deadlocked on the ABM, and the 1970 appropriation was
saved only by Vice President Agnew’s tie-breaking vote.
Nixon’s staff was surprised that the strongest opposition came from cities
due to be &dquo;protected&dquo; by ABMS-they’d expected protests from cities left
&dquo;undefended.&dquo; Better understanding the political risks attending the ABM,
Nixon worked to develop an institutional accomodation of the opponents’ con-
cerns. He redefined the ABM’s mission to defend weapons rather than cities,
relocating potential sites from metropolitan areas to remote missile fields in
less politically risky locales like Grand Forks, North Dakota. In doing so he
separated expert elite opposition from its grassroots activist base. Nixon also
began negotiations to limit ABM systems as a precursor to the 1972 SALT
treaty.
The ABM never dominated the political debate, as nuclear weapons issues
were overshadowed by more immediately salient problems, particularly the
Vietnam war and unrest in American cities. Nixon’s clever political response
to ABM opponents, compromise and active negotiations, made it difficult for
activists to build a broad movement. The eventual treaties effectively man-
aged the size of an ABM effort, defusing public opposition in the process.
Although ignoring potentially more destabilizing weapons, especially multiple
warhead missiles (MIRVs), the ABM and SALT treaties continued the institu-
tional arms control process and kept the public profile of nuclear weapons
relatively low.
THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT6
After the end of the Vietnam war, peace activists had a difficult time gener-
ating any kind of national campaign. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all
modernized US nuclear forces, but also worked to negotiate arms control
measures with the Soviet Union. All could claim they were doing everything
possible to limit nuclear armaments and the possibility of nuclear war, as
military spending declined from the Vietnam era peak of 1968. Essentially,
they were able to prevent the emergence of a single large policy problem to
serve as focus for a large opposition movement. Activists did, however, stage
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smaller campaigns against particular weapons systems, most notably the B-1
bomber and the MX missile. In such efforts, however, they often played a
subordinate role to elite allies, particularly the president. In the case of the
B-l, for example, antinuclear activists found themselves lobbying members of
Congress to support development of a nuclear-armed air launched cruise mis-
sile (ALCM) as an alternative (Kotz 1988: 154).
By the end of his term, Carter visibly retreated from his announced inau-
gural goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether, initiating a military
build-up. Partly a response to world events, including the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the Nicaraguan revolution, and Iranian militants’ taking Ameri-
can hostages in Teheran, Carter was also responding to increased domestic
political pressure, particularly the successful organizing campaign of SALT II
opponents. Activists who brought a &dquo;nuclear freeze&dquo; proposal to the Demo-
cratic national convention in New York City were rebuffed by the camps of
both Carter and challenger Edward Kennedy. Both candidates likely saw a
freeze platform plank as unwanted baggage for the general election. The 1980
electoral campaign preempted the development of strong opposition-for arms
control advocates, Carter was still preferable to his Republican opponent. The
freeze remained a solution in search of an opportunity: broad public concern
with a national security policy problem.
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Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, and his explicit commitment to &dquo;rebuild&dquo;
what he saw as America’s neglected armed forces, emphasized that institu-
tional routes for influence were not open to activists, and underscored activist
concern with nuclear weapons policy generally. The new Reagan administra-
tion repeatedly and forcefully demonstrated its commitment to policies peace
activists saw as bellicose. Administration officials were also candid in their
assessments of the prospects of limited nuclear wars, the necessity of strategic
superiority, and the futility of arms control; their rhetoric was untempered by
qualifiers or guarded language about &dquo;options.&dquo; Instead, they spoke cavalierly
about fighting and winning nuclear wars (Scheer 1982), and worked to pro-
vide the weapons to do so.
At the same time, the administration purged from the State and Defense
departments more moderate scientists and strategists unconvinced of the pos-
sibility or desirability of a war-winning strategic posture. In doing so, he
forced into public a longstanding elite schism that was generally confined to
expert venues. Many of these experts, robbed of access in the administration,
sought a broader public audience. Roger Molander, for example, who had
served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Carter, Ford,
and Nixon, formed a nonpartisan organization, Ground Zero, dedicated to
public education on nuclear weapons. Mass media attention followed elite crit-
icism of the Reagan program, subjecting the President’s policies and advisers
to an unusual degree of scrutiny. Finding doors for institutional access closed,
activists directed their efforts elsewhere, creating a wave of transnational dis-
sident activism.
Activists in the United States and Western Europe challenged the Reagan
program. Antinuclear movements in Western Europe emerged strongly in
1981, focusing specifically on stopping the NATO plan to deploy intermedi-
ate range nuclear missiles in five European countries (Risse-Kappen 1988;
Rochon 1988). European activists appealed to their counterparts in the United
States for help. Pacifists began direct action campaigns at military contractors,
submarine bases, missile sites, and even the Pentagon. At the same time arms
control advocates held educational events, sponsored symposia and teach-
ins, pressed local governments to adopt resolutions opposing the Reagan pro-
gram, and organized referenda campaigns.
Although activists espoused a broad variety of ultimate goals and means,
mass media grouped virtually all opponents of the Reagan administration’s
security policies under the banner of the &dquo;nuclear freeze.&dquo; As articulated by
Randall Forsberg (1984), a freeze proposal was the first step in a complicated
and comprehensive program to remake world politics. As generally explained
in mass media, it was an unfocused cry for arms control. The broad move-
ment coalition made this framing struggle particularly important, and activist
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efforts to control it especially difficult. As the movement grew, staging a June
1982 rally in New York City attended by some one million people, activists
were increasingly divided on the meaning of the proposal so many sup-
ported. Elite responses legitimated criticism of the Reagan administration, but
redefined the activists’ preferred policy solution.
Freeze activism, however vaguely defined, continued and brought increased
public and government attention to nuclear weapons issues. Early in 1982,
flanked by campaign leaders, Senator Kennedy announced that he would
introduce a freeze resolution in Congress. When the resolution failed by one
vote in the House of Representatives in 1982, activists pressed the issue in
congressional campaigns the following fall, claiming credit for Democratic
gains of 26 seats in the House. The following year, the Reagan administration
actively sought to limit its political vulnerability on national security, soften-
ing its rhetoric and floating a series of arms control proposals. The House
overwhelmingly passed an amended freeze resolution in 1983, although the
resolution failed in the Senate.
As the movement made inroads in institutional politics the freeze coali-
tion began to fray (Meyer 1993b). Institutionally oriented arms control
groups cultivated Washington connections and tried to influence a variety of
budget issues, urging Congress to push the President on arms control. This
approach seemed a more direct route to political influence than public edu-
cation or mass demonstrations, but the scope of the policy debate narrowed.
At the same time, many pacifist and left-liberal groups continued their activ-
ities, but shifted to more salient issues, such as supporting economic sanc-
tions against South Africa or preventing U.S. military intervention in Nicara-
gua. Finally, a number of peace groups were fully engaged in the upcoming
election. Six of seven Democratic presidential hopefuls endorsed some ver-
sion of a nuclear freeze proposal, including the eventual nominee, Walter
Mondale.
The Reagan administration worked to ensure the election was not a ref-
erendum on either the freeze or its own national security policies, by offering
a kind of institutional accommodation. In January of 1984, Reagan announced
his new commitment to arms control negotiations, and to restoring summit
meetings with the Soviet Union, offering conciliatory rhetoric to both freeze
supporters and the Soviets. Paradoxically, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initia-
tive, announced in 1983, allowed the President to shift the terms of debate,
attacking freeze supporters for defending the status quo, and promising even-
tual deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and a benign end to mutual nuclear
deterrence. At the same time, a somewhat strengthened congressional oppo-
sition prevented the most aggressive aspects of the Reagan build-up, limiting
growth of the budget, and effectively mandating arms control (Fascell 1987).
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The nuclear freeze movement did not end the arm race, as its initiators
explicitly intended, much less achieve the more ambitious goal of remaking
US foreign policy. Nonetheless, it effectively rescued the previous bipartisan
policy consensus, restricting the Reagan administration’s initiatives. It returned
legitimacy and institutional access to advocates of arms control and nuclear
restraint. Reagan’s arms control proposals,’ offered more for domestic political
reasons than international response, had extensive unexpected effects. The
new posture offered incoming Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev a lever
with which to reopen detente. When Gorbachev accepted the disproportion-
ate cuts in nuclear forces Reagan had proposed, the administration was cor-
nered. It couldn’t reject its own proposals. This forced flexibility on arms
control proved to be critical in ending the cold war (Meyer 1993a; Risse-
Kappen 1991). The movement won far less than it intended, yet it turned out
to be far more significant than anyone involved would have guessed.
CONCLUSIONS
Explanations of protest cycles that emphasize constant causes, such as human
disappointment or intractable social problems, clearly miss something impor-
tant. Collective behavior explanations would suggest that waves of activism
would reflect aggregate psychological phenomena, in the case of nuclear weap-
ons, fear. As noted above, however, public opinion on nuclear weapons has
remained generally constant. Only when elite actors have legitimated criti-
cism of government policy have strong movements emerged, and then through
organized political efforts, not anomic spontaneous action. A narrow resource
mobilization view, which emphasizes the provision of resources and the con-
stancy of grievances, neglects that resources become available when policy
changes and the intensity and focus of grievances changes.
Clearly, protest cycles are related to the broader political context and the
policymaking process. The cases suggest that policy shifts can provide polit-
ical space for challenging movements, and that governments may alter their
policies in order to reclaim that political space. Elite actors, particularly scientists
and strategic experts, mediate between the state and protest movements,
identifying which aspects of policy are most vulnerable to assault, legitimat-
ing and sometimes aiding insurgent movements, and framing solutions to the
political problems movements cause. As government reaches an accomoda-
tion with elite opponents, it becomes progressively harder for dissidents to
convince supporters of the need or efficacy of extra-institutional protest.
It is also clear that public policy and political alignments are critical and
fluid aspects of the structure of political opportunity that determine the polit-
ical space available to dissidents. In two of the four cases presented here, the
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scientists’ campaign for international control, and the anti-ABM campaign,
dissent was largely confined to elite debate and action, as mass attention
focused on more proximate or urgent issues. In the scientists’ campaign, pub-
lic attention after World War II focused first on domestic issues; when inter-
national concerns re-emerged, the Soviet threat overshadowed public fears of
nuclear weapons. Proponents of world government or international control of
nuclear weapons did not frame their differences with government policy with
sufficient clarity to mobilize mass action. Similarly, during the ABM debate
public attention generally focused on other more salient issues, particularly
the Vietnam war; grasssroots activism was confined to areas scheduled to
host ABM systems. President Nixon split the grassroots from their elite sup-
porters by changing the ABM’s mission and deployment sites. He also robbed
ABM opponents of their political initiative by actively pursuing arms control
agreements.
The apparent policy problems were larger and more immediate for the
two mass movements, the test ban and the nuclear freeze. Political and mili-
tary leaders in both the middle 1950s and early 1980s openly spoke of
fighting and winning nuclear wars. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Reagan all
stepped up civil defense plans, bringing the conduct of US nuclear policy
home to many Americans. In both cases dissident elites who had lost insti-
tutional political battles sought to mobilize mass support for their positions.
Public debates focused on the simplest and most salient aspects of policy:
atmospheric testing in the 1950s and 1960s; the propensity of the Reagan
administration to wage a nuclear war in the 1980s. With these narrow focal
points, broad movements grew very quickly. At the same time, however,
Presidents could split the dissident coalitions by addressing only the most
egregious irritant. The Kennedy administration ended superpower atmospheric
testing; the Reagan administration learned the civilities of arms control and
conciliatory rhetoric.
Movements subsided when an administration institutionalized at least
part of its opposition, narrowing the public debate and defusing public con-
cerns and activism. This institutional accomodation entailed symbolic con-
cessions, and sometimes real changes in policy. President Truman visibly
pursued international control of nuclear weapons, albeit in a way that made
success extremely unlikely. President Eisenhower made bureaucratic changes
to strengthen the institutional position of arms control advocates, first appoint-
ing a disarmament advisor, then creating a special scientific advisory board.
Secretary Dulles argued for establishing an arms control process, primarily to
manage domestic opposition, not the Soviet Union. The Kennedy administra-
tion actively sought a test ban, and used the popular movement to negotiate
with both the Soviet Union and the US military. President Nixon’s flexibility
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on deploying and negotiating about the ABM, reflected, if not the pressure of
anti-ABM forces, at least the wisdom of their arguments. The nuclear freeze
movement forced the Reagan administration to revise its public posture for
domestic political reasons. The administration made rhetorical concessions on
arms control to its opponents in the United States and West Europe, open-
ings Gorbachev used to resurrect detente.
By examining the fluidity of political opportunity on one set of issues
over time, I have shown the need to look at both stable and dynamic aspects
of opportunity-structure and space- to understand protest cycles. Protest
movements emerge when institutionally oriented actors lose faith in the effi-
cacy of institutional politics. At such times, they may forge alliances with
activists making broader claims and engaging in extra-institutional action.
The resultant movements lodge broad claims against the state, but generally
disperse after an administration re-integrates dissident elite into institutional
politics, often by restoring previous policies. The cyclic nature of movement
challenges reflects the shifting attention of elite actors from institutional ven-
ues to extra-institutional ones. Movements may then have the odd effect of
preserving policies they find abhorrent. Whether peace activists can mobilize
challenges after the Cold War, during a period of military demobilization
when all policy positions are subject to debate and intense scrutiny, is a
critically important-and open-question.
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